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Abstract. A European consensus was developed as a concept of operations 
(CONOPS) for cross-border, multi-professional chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear (CBRN) responses. AcciMaps were co-designed with professional responders 
from military, fire, ambulance, and police services in UK, Finland and Greece. Data 
were collected using document analysis from both open and restricted sources to 
extract task and operator information, and through interviews with senior staff 
representatives (Gold or Silver Command level). The data were represented on the 
Accimaps as a high level Socio-Technical Systems (STS) map of CBRN response 
using the themes of communication, planning, action, and reflection. Despite 
differences between service sectors and in terminology, a macro systems level 
consensus was achieved for the command structures (Gold, Silver and Bronze), and 
Hot Zone responders (Specialist Blue Light Responders and Blue Light Responders). 
The detailed tasks and technologies have been analysed using Hierarchical Task 
Analysis (HTA) to represent both complex response scenarios (macro) and detailed 
technologies (micro interfaces) for detection, diagnosis and decontamination. The 
outputs from these two systems mapping tools (Accimaps and HTAs) are being used 
in two field trials/exercises. 
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1 Introduction 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) and terrorist events will lead 
to emergency services having to respond in environments which are dangerous, 
complex, fast paced, high-stakes, unpredictable and substantially novel [1,2]. CBRN 
incidents in particular can cause a great deal of psychological stress due to the level of 
uncertainty both before and after an event has occurred, resulting not knowing where 
and when they might take place, and when responding through difficulties in 
identifying the substances involved and how best to deal with them [3]. This can be 
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especially true for emergency service responders (Fire, Police and Ambulance) whose 
actions and decisions within an event can directly save lives [4]. Yet, a lack of 
knowledge, skills or awareness in CBRN incidents may lead to such professionals 
being reticent to engage in their duties in the event of such an incident [5].  
The scale of mass casualty incidents (MCIs) such as CBRN events often require 
the cooperation of many varied organisations both on the ground and at the higher 
levels of command [6,7]. This multi-agency interoperability can bring with it many 
issues when the different emergency services are required to work together, possibly 
having unfamiliar working practices, technology, communication styles and goals [8-
11]. For a very large scale event there may even be a need for cross border assistance, 
increasing the likelihood of such issues of interoperability occurring [7,12].  
For these reasons having a better understanding of the emergency services’ 
procedures, both their own organisation (intra-team) and those of other emergency 
service responders (inter-team) who they will be required to work alongside, can be 
advantageous [2]. High level guidelines for response to CBRN incidents is provided 
by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as a concept of operations 
(CONOPS) covering information gathering, assessment and dissemination, scene 
management, saving/protecting lives, and specialist support [13]. A previous model of 
CBRN response by Healey et al. [14] chronologically mapped an event for 
prevention, preparedness, alerting/ early response, and remediation. This model 
allowed for response phases and events to be established but also had no detailed 
information about tasks that should occur, lines of communication needing to be 
established and where technologies might fit into the system. Having access to 
technologies, such as those which can quickly detect and identify substances or track 
patients and evidence in this chaotic environment can aid in situational awareness, 
thus reducing the psychological distress placed on emergency responders [15-18].   
Systems mapping methods that have previously been used to visualise a Social 
Technical System (STS) in other domains include AcciMaps [19] and Hierarchical 
Task Analysis (HTA) [20,21]. This paper describes the development of a CBRN 
AcciMap as a platform for development and evaluation of technology. An example of 
an HTA for a CBRN diagnostic technology is used to show how the 2 systems 
mapping tools can be used in conjunction to visualize macro and micro systems. 
2 Method 
2.1 Accimaps 
Participants were recruited through purposive sampling requiring them to have 
experience of operating at Silver or Gold levels of command and having previously 
worked at Bronze level, giving them knowledge of all levels of the STS, and ensuring 
they could provide relevant CONOPS documents.  
An iterative approach was used for the development of the AcciMaps with 
empirical data taken from both document analysis and interviews. Both open source 
(e.g. NATO [13]), and restricted (if access was approved) documents were read and 
the information from these was used for visualization of the multiple tasks and 
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responsibility levels on a single map. These initial data were subsequently expanded 
with interviews to describe specific task activities from first blue light responder 
arriving on scene upwards through the command chain.  
The Accimap was reviewed with a participant from each stakeholder service (fire, 
ambulance, police, and military) to discuss differences between written procedures 
(work as imagined) and operational activities (work as done). The individual service 
AcciMaps were compared to look for similarities and a higher abstraction level 
consensus AcciMap was developed. The EU final AcciMap was validated by all 
participants as meaningful for their country. 
2.2 Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) 
HTAs were created on both a macro level (mapping of the Field Trial/Exercise; FTX) 
and micro level (mapping of prototype technology). The macro HTAs were compiled 
through interviews with the lead organizer of each FTX; with information from these 
interviews mapped in a macro systems HTA for each FTX. These were reviewed and 
revised through an iterative process until the lead organisers confirmed them as an 
accurate depiction of the tasks in the FTX.  
The micro level HTAs were created for individual technologies which were at least 
Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 6 and above in development indicating that it is 
at least sufficiently developed to be demonstrated in a relevant environment. Data 
were collected from document analysis (e.g. instruction manuals and user guides) and 
interviews with the technology developers to map out mental models of how the 
technology should work (‘work as imagined’). The HTAs were then reviewed and 
validated by the developers as accurate representations.   
3 Results 
3.1 Accimaps 
A final harmonised (consensus) Accimap was created (Figure 1) with cross-cutting 
themes of Communication, Planning, Action, and Reflection. Although the structure 
of command in an incident was similar across the EU the terminology used sometimes 
varied with Silver command and Bronze Command terms being described as 
‘Tactical’, ‘Incident’, and ‘Operational’. These levels always reported to a Gold 
Command (Strategic) and managed (were supported by) Specialist Blue Light 
Responders (S-BLR) and initial Blue Light Responders (BLR).  
Working from the base of the hierarchy, the BLRs would often be first on scene as 
part of the conventional response to everyday emergency calls. Their role in CBRN is 
limited by their level of equipment and training but it was agreed across all countries 
that at a minimum they would recognise the scene as a possible CBRN event and pass 
information to the control rooms to initate dispatch of specialists (S-BLR) with 
greater CBRN response capabilities.  
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The Bronze/On-Scene Command is responsible for ensuring all resources 
(equipment and personnel) are optimally used by applying the Incident Command 
Tactical Plan (T-Plan), and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). They are also  
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Fig. 1.  EU wide Accimap (previously published in Hancox et al. [22]) 
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responsible for managing the BLR and S-BLR, and apply the Operational Plan (O-
Plan).  
Silver/Incident Command manages the T-Plan to track and monitor the resources 
needed in the CBRN response. They are typically, but not always (depending on 
service and country), located at a distance from the CBRN scene and have a broader 
perspective of the incident which allows them to offer advice to the Bronze/ On-scene 
Command. They act a point of contact for Gold and Bronze commands, controlling 
the information flowing up and down the STS, and reducing the likelihood of 
information overload.  
Gold/Strategic Command implements the Strategic Plan (S-Plan) based on policies, 
legal frame-works and protocols. This requires managing resources on a regional, 
national and international level with a more ‘outward facing’ perspective, and acting 
as a point of contact for Government representatives and public messages (via the 
media). They also consider (plan for) limiting the after effects of the incident, so 
make decisions based to plan for returning to readiness (‘business as usual’).  
Control Room/Dispatch is represented in Figure 1 as a communication spine, 
transmitting information up and down the hierarchy. This is most frequently achieved 
with the use of dedicated radio and wireless channels across all levels; 
communication in the STS mostly takes place only between adjacent levels. A 
dedicated Major Incident Control Room (Con.Room) is usually set up in later stages 
of the incident for each agency.   
3.2 Hierarchical Task Analysis  
HTA was used in 2 ways, firstly to expand the Accimaps and map the events (as 
goals, tasks, sub-tasks and plans) for two FTXs to support testing of prototype 
technologies in a simulated CBRN event; this was the ‘macro’ element to look at the 
system as a whole. Secondly HTAs were created for individual technologies to 
represent the ‘micro’ element of the system - how each technology would be used 
within the system.   
Figure 2 shows an example of a technology HTA to map the series of tasks, sub-
tasks and plans for a prototype breath analyser. The 8 subtasks give a clear and 
concise process from preparing the device for use through to decontamination.   
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Fig. 2. Breath analysis Hierarchical Task Analysis 
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4 Discussion 
A new consensus of an EU harmonised civilian CBRN systems (CONOPS) was 
achieved through cross mapping the planned responses to CBRN events in a number 
of EU countries (Greece, Finland, Czech Republic and UK). This shows that there are 
at commonalities when dealing with CBRN incidents across services and borders 
which support interoperability. Technology developers who may be less familiar with 
CBRN response procedures, may also benefit from Figure 1 with a greater 
understanding of the systems to support their technology integration.  
The Accimap model approach taken in this paper may be sufficiently detailed for 
mapping EU wide CBRN responses as more specific inter-operating procedures may 
not be achievable as commented by Mendonça et al. [23], “extreme events occur 
infrequently, and no two are exactly the same. A comprehensive set of procedures to 
cover the space of possible events may be impossible to achieve”. Nevertheless, some 
parts of a response, such as the task steps to use a CBRN detection technology may 
benefit from more detail; this was tested in this paper with using the HTA method..  
The combination of the 2 methods gives both a very broad overview of the tasks 
occurring in a CBRN event on an EU wide scale, with details for simulated scenarios 
and technology use from the HTAs representing a combination of the ‘macro 
perspective’ encompassing the system as a whole, with the more ‘micro perspective’. 
HTAs focusing on the tasks, sub-tasks and plans to use technology were useful by 
allowing technology developers to clearly see where their technology could fit into 
the macro perspective system and similarly the FTX  scenario planners to see the 
micro tasks that need to be accommodated for successful technology use within their 
planned trial/exercise. The 2 approaches proved useful in complementing one another 
in mapping macro and micro systems so people from all audiences and backgrounds 
could understand what would occur in a CBRN event.  
5 Conclusions 
Inter-operability is essential in a CBRN incident response for a shared understanding 
of response plans and activities. For developers to design technology that efficiently 
works within systems of response requires an understanding of the planned responses.  
An adapted Accimap methodology proved useful in mapping an EU wide CBRN 
response in conjunction with more specific HTAs to show the numerous specific 
actions at both macro and micro-perspectives.  
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